

Treasury Management Strategy Statement

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement
and Annual Investment Strategy

2020/21

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day-to-day treasury management activities.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

“The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

1.2 Reporting requirements

1.2.1 Capital Strategy

The CIPFA 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report that will provide the following:

- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

This capital strategy is reported separately from the Treasury Management Strategy Statement; non-treasury investments will be reported through the former. This ensures the separation of the core treasury function under security, liquidity and yield principles, and the policy and commercialism investments usually driven by expenditure on an asset. The capital strategy will show:

- The corporate governance arrangements for these types of activities;
- Any service objectives relating to the investments;
- The expected income, costs and resulting contribution;
- The debt related to the activity and the associated interest costs;
- The payback period (MRP policy);
- For non-loan type investments, the cost against the current market value;
- The risks associated with each activity.

Where a physical asset is being bought, details of market research, advisers used, (and their monitoring), ongoing costs and investment requirements and any credit information will be disclosed, including the ability to sell the asset and realise the investment cash.

Where the Council has borrowed to fund any non-treasury investment, there should also be an explanation of why borrowing was required and why the MHCLG Investment Guidance and CIPFA Prudential Code have not been adhered to. *(Note that the Council has established a Commercial Investment Framework defining the risks, mitigation and objectives of commercial investment).*

If any non-treasury investment sustains a loss during the final accounts and audit process, the strategy and revenue implications will be reported through the same procedure as the capital strategy.

To demonstrate the proportionality between the treasury operations and the non-treasury operation, high-level comparators are shown throughout this report.

1.2.2 Treasury Management reporting

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

- a. **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
 - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
 - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
 - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
 - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).
- b. **A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c. **An annual treasury report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

1.3 Scrutiny

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. The Cabinet undertakes this role.

1.4 Treasury Management Strategy for 2020/21

The strategy for 2020/21 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

1.5 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. Members undertook training on 26 June 2019 and further training will be arranged as required. The training needs of treasury management officers are reviewed periodically.

There is a post with specific responsibility for treasury management within the accountancy team and the Council is committed to ensuring the holder has relevant qualifications and has access to the training and support required to undertake this role.

In addition, the Council's treasury management team is a member of the South West Treasury Management Benchmarking Group hosted by Link Asset Services. This group has members from approximately 14 authorities and provides a forum for interpreting Treasury Management data across the area and sharing best practice. The group also allows the opportunity to consider any potential forthcoming treasury management risks, the early identification of which can aid proactive investment management.

The Council maintains an internal audit function through the South West Audit Partnership (SWAP). SWAP undertakes a periodic internal audit review of the treasury management function. In the latest audit by SWAP, which covered the 2018/19 financial year, the treasury management function was given a Reasonable Opinion.

Further review is also provided by the external audit team, who consider the reporting of treasury management data within the financial statements as part of their external audit opinion work.

1.6 Treasury management consultants

The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

It is the intention that the scope of investments within the Council's operations will include both conventional treasury investments, (the placing of residual cash from the Council's functions), and more commercial type investments, such as investment properties. The commercial type investments require specialist advisers, and the Council will seek to appoint suitable specialist advisers in relation to this activity, as and when required.

1.7 IFRS 16 - Leasing

IFRS 16 Leasing requires that lessees bring leases that were previously off balance sheet onto the balance sheet. Implementation for the public sector has been delayed until 2020/21.

However, in the meantime, local authorities who are lessees need to consider what changes they will need to make to adjust their figures as at 1 April 2020 for Capital Financing Requirement, External debt (Other long-term liabilities), Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary. This is to allow for leases, previously off balance sheet, being brought onto the balance sheet from that date.

It is not currently possible to be precise about such adjustment figures until detailed data gathering has been substantially completed later in the 2020/21 financial year. Therefore, the Capital Financing Requirement, External debt (Other long-term liabilities), Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary may need to be amended mid-year, once the detailed impact is known for the Council.

1.8 Treasury Investments, Non-Financial Investments, Commercial Investments

The Capital Financing Requirement in the Treasury Management Strategy Statement, (this document), gives an holistic view of the Council's borrowing need, taking into account not only the capital expenditure planned on the Non-HRA and HRA but also the expenditure planned on Non-Financial Investments (i.e. service – related investments and loans) and Commercial Activity Investments. However, other than this, Non-Financial and Commercial investments are not dealt with in this document but in the separate Capital Strategy Statement.

2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2020/21 – 2022/23

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

These indicators help show the effect of the financing and borrowing strategy that the Council plans to adopt over the next three financial years.

The indicators also act as an early warning system, to flag up if the Council decides to set capital programmes without the necessary finances to fund them.

2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts.

Capital expenditure	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Non-HRA	9,417	10,609	6,695	1,495	565
HRA	7,829	4,846	4,906	4,906	4,906
Non-financial investments ¹	1,575	2,505	1,000	1,000	0
Commercial activities ¹	0	2,700	7,000	7,000	3,300
Total Capital Expenditure	18,821	20,660	19,601	14,401	8,771

¹ Commercial activities and non-financial investments relate respectively to areas such as capital expenditure on investment properties, loans to third parties etc.

² Other long-term liabilities: the above financing need excludes other long-term liabilities, such as PFI and leasing arrangements that already include borrowing instruments.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans how they are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Financing of capital expenditure	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Total Capital Expenditure	18,821	20,660	19,601	14,401	8,771
Capital receipts ³	(1,945)	(9,700)	(600)	(888)	(1,031)
Capital grants	(918)	(1,943)	(3,532)	(593)	(323)
Capital reserves	(4,151)	(4,346)	(4,406)	(4,406)	(4,406)
Revenue	(5,362)	(2,323)	(2,054)	(70)	0
Financed in year	(12,376)	18,312	10,592	5,957	5,760
Net financing need for the year ³	6,445	2,348	9,009	8,444	3,011

3 Capital Receipts in 2019/20 include the Non-HRA receipt of around £9.1m expected from the sale of Knowle. This reduces the overall net financing need for that year.

4 The net financing need for non-financial investments/ commercial activities **included** in the above tables is shown below:

Non-financial investments & commercial activities	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Capital Expenditure	1,575	5,205	8,000	8,000	3,300
Financing	(650)	0	0	0	0
Net financing need for the year	925	5,205	8,000	8,000	3,300
Percentage of total net financing need % ³	14.3%	221.7%	88.8%	94.7%	109.6%

2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge that broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI and finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the PFI, PPP lease provider and so the Council is not required to borrow separately for these schemes. The Council currently has no such schemes within the CFR.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Capital Financing Requirement					
CFR Non-HRA	10,063	7,254	8,062	8,276	7,751
CFR HRA	80,595	80,584	80,576	80,568	80,559
CFR Non-financial investments	4,733	7,151	6,549	6,491	6,369
CFR Commercial activities	0	2,700	9,632	16,391	19,281
Total CFR	95,391	97,689	104,819	111,726	113,960
Movement in CFR	6,263	2,298	7,130	6,907	2,234

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	6,445	2,348	9,009	8,444	3,011
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements*	(182)	(50)	(1,879)	(1,537)	(777)
Movement in CFR	6,263	2,298	7,130	6,907	2,234

* MRP = Minimum Revenue Provision. VRP = Voluntary Revenue Provision. Other financing movements will include any PFI/ finance lease annual principal amounts

A key aspect of the regulatory and professional guidance is that elected members are aware of the size and scope of any commercial activity in relation to the authority's overall financial position. The capital expenditure figures shown in section 2.1 and the details above demonstrate the scope of this activity and, by approving these figures, consider the scale proportionate to the Authority's remaining activity.

2.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an **MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options is provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

For all unsupported borrowing, (including finance leases), the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3).

This option provides for a reduction in the borrowing need over approximately the asset's life. The use of this option by EDDC is consistent with the prior year.

There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision but there is a requirement for a charge for depreciation to be made.

Repayments included in finance leases are applied as MRP.

MRP Overpayments - A change introduced by the revised MHCLG MRP Guidance was the allowance that any charges made over the statutory minimum revenue provision (MRP), voluntary revenue provision or overpayments, can, if needed, be reclaimed in later years if deemed necessary or prudent. In order for these sums to be reclaimed for use in the budget, this policy must disclose the cumulative overpayment made each year. Up until the 31 March 2019 the total VRP overpayments, (wholly in respect of the HRA), were £4,424,409.

3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current portfolio position

The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2019 and for the position as at 31 December 2019 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

A more detailed schedule of investments and borrowing may be found in Appendix 5.6

TREASURY PORTFOLIO				
	Actual	Actual	Current	Current
	31.3.19	31.3.19	31.12.19	31.12.19
	£000	%	£000	%
Treasury investments				
Banks	2,900	7.8%	2,900	5.4%
Building Societies - unrated	0	0.0%	5,500	10.3%
Building Societies - rated	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Local Authorities	0	0.0%	7,500	14.1%
Money Market Funds	4,200	11.4%	7,450	14.0%
Total managed in house	7,100	19.2%	23,350	43.8%
Money Market Funds*	29,896	80.8%	29,950	56.2%
Property Funds	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total managed externally	29,896	80.8%	29,950	56.2%
Total treasury investments	36,996	100.0%	53,300	100.0%
Treasury external borrowing				
Local Authorities	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
PWLB	88,115	100.0%	87,173	100.0%
Total external borrowing	88,115	100.0%	87,173	100.0%
Net treasury investments / (borrowing)	(51,119)	0.0%	(33,873)	0.0%
<i>* market value</i>				

The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Actual Gross External Debt					
Borrowing at 1 April	88,243	90,192	91,990	90,514	96,839
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL) at 1 April	0	0	0	0	0
Gross Debt at 1 April	88,243	90,192	91,990	90,514	96,839
Expected change in borrowing	2,108	1,798	(1,476)	6,325	1,915
Late adjustment 2018/19 to bank overdraft figure	(159)	0	0	0	0
Expected change in OLTL	0	0	0	0	0
Gross debt at 31 March	90,192	91,990	90,514	96,839	98,754
Capital Financing Requirement	95,391	97,689	104,819	111,726	113,960
Under / (over) borrowing	5,199	5,699	14,305	14,887	15,206

(As reported in section 1.7 above, please note that the Capital Financing Requirement, External debt (Other long-term liabilities), Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary may need to be amended mid-year, once the detailed impact of IFRS 16 Leasing is known for the Council).

Within the above figures, the level of debt relating to non financial investments/ commercial activities is:

	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
External Debt for commercial investments / service investments					
Non Financial Investments	2,747	5,187	4,608	4,864	4,767
Commercial Activities	0	0	0	6,910	9,778
Gross debt at 31 March	2,747	5,187	4,608	11,774	14,545
Percentage of total external debt %	3.05%	5.64%	5.09%	12.16%	14.73%

Within the range of prudential indicators, there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2020/21 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Section 151 Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

3.2.1 The operational boundary. This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Operational boundary	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Debt HRA/ non-HRA	87,445	86,803	85,906	85,065
Other long term liabilities	0	0	0	0
Service investments	5,187	5,187	4,864	4,864
Commercial investments	0	0	6,910	9,778
Total	92,632	91,990	97,680	99,707

3.2.2 The authorised limit for external debt. This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt, which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised limit	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Borrowing	102,881	102,250	107,948	109,984
Other long term liabilities	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Total	103,881	103,250	108,948	110,984

The authorised limit includes an additional amount as headroom for unanticipated cash movements, including those due to slippage.

Headroom for the Non-HRA is set at £3.0m, and an additional £1.0m has been included to allow for potential increases in debt that might result from accounting changes following the implementation of IFRS 16 Leases on 1 April 2020: (other long term liabilities).

For the HRA, a debt cap of £87.844m set by the Government as the authorised limit has been used; although the Government abolished HRA debt caps in October 2018, the Council still uses it internally to define the maximum HRA CFR limit for its HRA self-financing regime. This internal limit is currently:

HRA Debt Limit	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
HRA debt cap *	87,844	87,844	87,844	87,844
HRA CFR	80,584	80,576	80,568	80,559
HRA headroom	7,260	7,268	7,276	7,285

3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Their central view is given in Appendix 5.2.

3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2020/21 treasury operations. The Section 151 Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.*
- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.*

Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

In practice therefore, the borrowing strategy is dependent on the amount and timing of capital expenditure, given the market conditions at the time, and the capital-financing requirement is likely to be funded via a combination of external fund disinvestment and/or loans from the PWLB.

3.5 Cash Flow or Temporary Borrowing

In addition to borrowing for capital purposes, the Council also borrows in the short-term to meet day-to-day shortages in its call account. This borrowing requirement is inherent within the operation of this account and is normally covered overnight via the call account overdraft and cleared the next day.

In some instances, particularly around the year-end, the overdraft may not provide a sufficient short-term buffer, and in these instances, the Council can borrow via the market at fixed rates for a fixed term of less than 3 months.

Currently there is no indication that such borrowing will be required at the end of 2019/20.

3.6 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Borrowing in advance will be made within the constraints that:

- It will be limited to no more than the expected increase in borrowing need (CFR) over the three year planning period; and
- The authority would not look to borrow more than 12 months in advance of need.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

3.7 Debt rescheduling

Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur as the 100 bps increase in PWLB rates only applied to new borrowing rates and not to premature debt repayment rates.

If rescheduling is done, it will be reported to Cabinet at the earliest meeting following its action.

New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing

Following the decision by the PWLB on 9 October 2019 to increase their margin over gilt yields by 100 bps to 180 basis points on loans lent to local authorities, consideration may need to be given in future to sourcing funding at cheaper rates from other local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities), financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks) and the Municipal Bonds Agency (no issuance at present but there is potential). The degree to which any of these options proves cheaper than PWLB Certainty Rate is still evolving at the time of writing but our advisors will keep us informed. At a later date, therefore, it may be practical to review with members such alternative sources or types of borrowing and draw up an approved schedule of those which might be appropriate for the Council to undertake, if required.

4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

4.1 Investment policy – management of risk

The MHCLG and CIPFA have extended the meaning of ‘investments’ to include both financial investments and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, (essentially the purchase of income yielding assets), are covered in the Capital Strategy, (a separate report).

The Council’s investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG’s Guidance on Local Government Investments (“the Guidance”)
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 (“the Code”)
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

The Council’s investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.
2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets.
3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
4. This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are two lists in appendix 5.4 under the categories of ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments.
 - a. **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.
 - b. **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use.
5. **Non-specified investments limit.** The Council has determined that it will limit the maximum total exposure to non-specified investments as being £20m of the total investment portfolio at the point of investment, (see section 5.4).

6. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the table in section 4.3.

7. Only the Council's external funds can be invested for **longer than 365 days** ¹, (see section 5.1.4).

¹ *Allowing additional day(s) for deposits due to mature on a non-business day or that span a leap year.*

8. All investments will be denominated in **sterling**.

9. As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2019/20 under IFRS 9, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments that could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years commencing from 1.4.18.)

However, this authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see section 4.7). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

Changes in risk management policy from last year.

The above criteria are unchanged from last year, subject to the note clarifying item 7 above.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment section 5.4; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Strategic Lead Finance will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to those that determine which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality that the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Counterparty ratings are monitored on a real time basis via notifications received from Link Asset Services as the agencies publish modifications. In addition a full review of the counterparty list is carried out on a regular basis.

The security of the Council's financial assets is paramount, and whilst the strategy needs to be clear in this area it also needs to be sufficiently comprehensive and iterative in order to provide operational flexibility within, what at times, is a volatile macroeconomic environment. As the financial backdrop changes it is essential that the strategy is set to enable an efficient response to those changes.

The Council manages the majority of its internal investments via money market funds and a range of banks and building societies in line with the creditworthiness criteria referred to below. Additionally the Council has opened a Debt Management Deposit Account Facility with the UK Government's Debt Management Office.

In order to address the need for flexibility, and to ensure the spread of risk, access to an investment portal has been arranged which allows officers to review and potentially transact with a small range of money market funds directly. All money market funds considered suitable with reference to the creditworthiness criteria will be approved for use by the S.151 Officer before an account is opened. The Council currently has access to four money market funds; if appropriate operationally, consideration will be given to opening an additional money market fund in the future.

This strategy was changed to include corporate bonds within its creditworthiness criteria for the first time in 2016/17. Investments in corporate bonds are limited to a duration of less than 1 year, must be AAA rated and have a maximum value of £2m per investee. The Council will not trade corporate bonds directly, but will trade via a specialist investment intermediary, whose fee is linked to the return. Given the short duration it is anticipated the majority of trades will be via the secondary market.

In the 2018/19 Treasury Management Strategy, the Council approved the inclusion of alternative investments such as Property Funds in Non-Specified Investments.

The use of these instruments can be deemed capital expenditure, and as such will be an application (spending) of capital resources. This Authority will seek guidance on the status of any fund it may consider using. Appropriate due diligence will also be carried out before investment of this type is undertaken.

4.3 Creditworthiness Criteria

The Council's proposed creditworthiness criteria are included in the table below.

Creditworthiness Criteria		
	Criteria	Maximum Money and/ or % Investment Limit
External (Long Term) Investment Fund		
Collective Investment Schemes (e.g. bond funds)	AAA long-term rating backed up with lowest volatility (V1/S1)	60% of External Fund total
Alternative Investment Funds e.g. property funds	The use of these instruments can be deemed to be capital expenditure, and as such will be an application (spending) of capital resources. This Authority will seek guidance on the status of any fund it may consider using. Appropriate due diligence will also be carried out before investment of this type is undertaken.	£10m
Cash Flow/ Internal Investments		
Deposit Building Societies	With over £5 Billion in total assets	£3m
Deposit Building Societies	With over £1 Billion in total assets	£2m
Deposit with UK incorporated banks	Minimum F1, A1 or P1 short term backed up by A long term credit rating	£2m
Deposit with banks incorporated outside the UK but entitled to accept deposits in the UK	Minimum F1, A1 or P1 short term backed up by A long term credit rating	£2m
Money Market Funds	AAA Long Term Rating	£3m
UK Local, Police & Fire Authorities		£3m
UK Government Treasury Bills/ Gilts/ Debt Management Deposit Facility		No limit
Corporate Bonds	AAA and less than one year duration	£2m
<i>The "deposits" referred to in the above table relate either to cash, floating rate notes or certificates of deposit.</i>		

The Council will not invest in subsidiaries that do not have a credit rating in their own right and a separate FSA licence from the parent company.

In the event of a downgrade resulting in a counterparty or investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.

Any changes in counterparty ratings or other criteria that put the counterparty below the minimum criteria whilst the Council holds a deposit will be brought to the attention of the Strategic Lead Finance and the Portfolio Holder for Finance immediately, with an appropriate response decided on a case-by-case basis.

The Council's current counterparty list is included at section 5.5.

It is recommended that Cabinet approves the creditworthiness criteria above.

The proposed criteria for specified and non-specified investments are shown in Appendix 5.4 for approval.

4.4 UK banks – ring fencing

The largest UK banks, (those with more than £25bn of retail / Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) deposits), are required, by UK law, to separate core retail banking services from their investment and international banking activities by 1st January 2019. This is known as “ring-fencing”. Whilst smaller banks with less than £25bn in deposits are exempt, they can choose to opt up. Several banks are very close to the threshold already and so may come into scope in the future regardless.

Ring-fencing is a regulatory initiative created in response to the global financial crisis. It mandates the separation of retail and SME deposits from investment banking, in order to improve the resilience and resolvability of banks by changing their structure. In general, simpler, activities offered from within a ring-fenced bank, (RFB), will be focused on lower risk, day-to-day core transactions, whilst more complex and “riskier” activities are required to be housed in a separate entity, a non-ring-fenced bank, (NRFB). This is intended to ensure that an entity's core activities are not adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.

While the structure of the banks included within this process may have changed, the fundamentals of credit assessment have not. The Council will continue to assess the new-formed entities in the same way that it does others and those with sufficiently high ratings, (and any other metrics considered), will be considered for investment purposes.

4.5 Investment strategy

4.5.1 In-house funds. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.
- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

4.5.2 Investment returns expectations.

On the assumption that the UK and EU agree a Brexit deal including the terms of trade by the end of 2020 or soon after, then Bank Rate is forecast to increase only slowly over the next few years to reach 1.25% by quarter 1 2023. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- Q1 2021 0.75%
- Q1 2022 1.00%
- Q1 2023 1.25%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.25%
- 2020/21 1.50%
- 2022/23 2.00%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

2019/20	0.75%
2020/21	0.75%
2021/22	1.00%
2022/23	1.25%
2023/24	1.50%
2024/25	1.75%
Later years	2.25%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably to the downside due to the weight of all the uncertainties over Brexit, as well as a softening global economic picture.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are broadly similarly to the downside.
- In the event that a Brexit deal is agreed with the EU and approved by Parliament, the balance of risks to economic growth and to increases in Bank Rate is likely to change to the upside.

4.7 Investment performance/ risk benchmarking

This Council will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 7 day LIBID.

4.8 End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

4.9 External fund managers

The Council currently has the following amounts invested:

External Funds			
	Fitch International Fund Quality Rating	Fitch Fund Market Sensitivity Rating	Total Investment £M
Pooled Investment Vehicles, OEICS			
Royal London Asset Management - Cash Plus Fund	AAAf	S1	14.48
Payden & Rygel - Sterling Reserve Fund	AAAf	S1	15.47
			29.95
The AAAf Fund Quality Credit Rating reflects the very high credit quality of a fund, as measured by its weighted average rating factor.			
The S1 Fund Market Sensitivity Rating reflects a fund's very low sensitivity to market risk factors. It also takes into account the investment advisor's strong capabilities as well as the fund's sound legal and regulatory environment.			

It is anticipated that in 2020/21 and beyond, up to £10m of the above funds will be utilised to finance the Council's commercial investment activity as opposed to borrowing externally.

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5.1 CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL & TREASURY INDICATORS 2020/21 – 2022/23

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

5.1.1 Capital Expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts.

Capital expenditure	2018/19 Actual £000	2019/20 Estimate £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000
Non-HRA	9,417	10,609	6,695	1,495	565
HRA	7,829	4,846	4,906	4,906	4,906
Non-financial investments ¹	1,575	2,505	1,000	1,000	0
Commercial activities ¹	0	2,700	7,000	7,000	3,300
Total Capital Expenditure	18,821	20,660	19,601	14,401	8,771

¹ Commercial activities and non-financial investments relate to areas such as capital expenditure on investment properties, loans to third parties etc.

² Other long-term liabilities: the above financing need excludes other long-term liabilities, such as PFI and leasing arrangements that already include borrowing instruments.

5.1.2 Affordability prudential indicator

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework, prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicator:

Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long-term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report. A positive figure in the table below indicates external debt.

	2018/19 Actual %	2019/20 Estimate %	2020/21 Estimate %	2021/22 Estimate %	2022/23 Estimate %
Non-HRA	(1.08)	(2.30)	0.42	(0.03)	(0.04)
HRA	15.30	15.15	14.30	13.17	12.81
Non Financial Investments/ Commercial Activities	(0.21)	(0.03)	(1.57)	(1.07)	(0.07)
Total	14.01	12.82	13.15	12.07	12.70

A negative figure reflects the estimation that a higher level of investment income is received compared to that paid out in borrowing.

The increase in the Non-HRA figure in 2019/20 reflects the impact of the receipt of the sale proceeds of Knowle. The decrease in the Non-HRA figure in 2020/21 reflects the planned reduction in treasury investment balances in order to finance half of the commercial activities; the figure for Non Financial Investments/ Commercial activities increases accordingly in the same year. In 2020/21 the figure for Non Financial Investments/ Commercial Activities decreases as borrowing costs increase from financing the remaining half of the Commercial Activities.

5.1.3 Maturity structure of borrowing

Maturity structure of borrowing. *(This is the amount of projected long-term borrowing that is due for repayment in each period, expressed as a percentage of total borrowing).* These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

At any point, the actual percentages of debt projected to mature in each year will add up to 100%, but the proposed indicator is for a range of approved percentages. This gives discretion within an approved range to the treasury team. It does mean that each 'set' of figures will sum to more than 100%.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2020/21			
		Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	2019/20	0%	20%
12 months to 2 years	2020/21	0%	20%
2 years to 5 years	2021/22 – 2024/25	0%	25%
5 years to 10 years	2025/26 – 2029/30	0%	25%
10 years to 20 years	2030/31 – 2039/40	0%	55%
20 years to 30 years	2040/41 – 2049/50	0%	20%
30 years to 40 years	2050/51 – 2059/60	0%	20%
40 years to 50 years	2060/61 – 2069/70	0%	20%

Within the HRA, the majority of the loans are over the longer term, as aligned to the HRA business plan, resulting in the upper limit being higher from years 2 - 5 onwards. Also, projected borrowing for commercial investments acts to increase the upper limit.

The upper limits on the maturity structure of borrowing will shift slightly each year as the maturity dates draw closer. However, the limits shown are in line with expectations based on the funding plans.

In addition to the above, the Council has an overdraft limit of £0.35m and can, if required, borrow for periods less than 3 months at fixed rates, in order to meet daily cash flow requirements. The Strategy is managed so as to avoid short-term fixed borrowing where possible. With the exception of the bank overdraft therefore, all borrowing the Council undertakes is at a fixed rate of interest.

The actual amounts maturing in each period are shown in the table below and reflect both the actual and potential loan commitments as referred to elsewhere within this strategy.

Based on capital borrowing plans included in the budget and plans for commercial investment, the current projected maturity structure of borrowing is shown below:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2020/21			
		£000	%
Under 12 months	2019/20	2,891	2.82%
12 months to 2 years	2020/21	4,727	4.61%
2 years to 5 years	2021/22 – 2024/25	17,534	17.09%
5 years to 10 years	2025/26 – 2029/30	18,423	17.95%
10 years to 20 years	2030/31 – 2039/40	50,606	49.31%
20 years to 30 years	2040/41 – 2049/50	3,470	3.38%
30 years to 40 years	2050/51 – 2059/60	4,374	4.26%
40 years to 50 years	2060/61 – 2069/70	596	0.58%
Total		102,621	100%

5.1.4 Upper Limit for Total Principal Sums invested over 365 days

This limit is set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment. The Council is asked to confirm approval that only external investments, (i.e. those managed by external fund managers), can be invested for over 365 days¹. Currently the Council has £29.95m in specified investments with external fund managers. Although these investments have been held continuously for over 365 days, in practice, the Council has been free to access the funds on quarter days without loss of income or access the funds with 3 days' notice, if necessary.

¹ Allowing additional day(s) for deposits due to mature on a non-business day or that span a leap year.

5.2 INTEREST RATE FORECASTS 2020 – 2023

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives their central view.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23
Bank Rate View	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
3 Month LIBID	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
6 Month LIBID	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
12 Month LIBID	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70
5yr PVLB Rate	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.70	2.80	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20
10yr PVLB Rate	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.90	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50
25yr PVLB Rate	3.30	3.40	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.70	3.70	3.80	3.90	4.00	4.00	4.10	4.10
50yr PVLB Rate	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.60	3.70	3.80	3.90	3.90	4.00	4.00

The above forecasts have been based on an assumption that there is an agreed deal on Brexit, including agreement on the terms of trade between the UK and EU, at some point in time. The result of the general election has removed much uncertainty around this major assumption. However, it does not remove uncertainty around whether

agreement can be reached with the EU on a trade deal within the short time to December 2020, as the prime minister has pledged.

It has been little surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75% so far in 2019 due to the ongoing uncertainty over Brexit and the outcome of the general election. In its meeting on 7 November, the MPC became more dovish due to increased concerns over the outlook for the domestic economy if Brexit uncertainties were to become more entrenched, and for weak global economic growth: if those uncertainties were to materialise, then the MPC were likely to cut Bank Rate. However, if they were both to dissipate, then rates would need to rise at a “gradual pace and to a limited extent”. Brexit uncertainty has had a dampening effect on UK GDP growth in 2019, especially around mid-year. There is still some residual risk that the MPC could cut Bank Rate as the UK economy is still likely to only grow weakly in 2020 due to continuing uncertainty over whether there could effectively be a no deal Brexit in December 2020 if agreement on a trade deal is not reached with the EU. Until that major uncertainty is removed, or the period for agreeing a deal is extended, it is unlikely that the MPC would raise Bank Rate.

Bond yields / PWLB rates. There has been much speculation during 2019 that the bond market has gone into a bubble, as evidenced by high bond prices and remarkably low yields. However, given the context that there have been heightened expectations that the US was heading for a recession in 2020, and a general background of a downturn in world economic growth, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued, conditions are ripe for low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last thirty years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last thirty years. We have therefore seen over the last year, many bond yields up to ten years in the Eurozone actually turn negative. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby ten-year yields have fallen below shorter-term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated, as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities. However, stock markets are also currently at high levels as some investors have focused on chasing returns in the context of dismal ultra-low interest rates on cash deposits.

During the first half of 2019-20 to 30 September, gilt yields plunged and caused a near halving of longer term PWLB rates to completely unprecedented historic low levels. (See paragraph 3.7 for comments on the increase in the PWLB rates margin over gilt yields of 100bps introduced on 9.10.19.) There is though, an expectation that financial markets have gone too far in their fears about the degree of the downturn in US and world growth. If, as expected, the US only suffers a mild downturn in growth, bond markets in the US are likely to sell off and that would be expected to put upward pressure on bond yields, not only in the US, but also in the UK due to a correlation between US treasuries and UK gilts; at various times this correlation has been strong but at other times weak. However, forecasting the timing of this, and how strong the correlation is likely to be, is very difficult to forecast with any degree of confidence. Changes in UK Bank Rate will also impact on gilt yields.

One potential danger that may be lurking in investor minds is that Japan has become mired in a twenty-year bog of failing to get economic growth and inflation up off the floor, despite a combination of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus by both the

central bank and government. Investors could be fretting that this condition might become contagious to other western economies.

Another danger is that unconventional monetary policy post 2008, (ultra-low interest rates plus quantitative easing), may end up doing more harm than good through prolonged use. Low interest rates have encouraged a debt-fuelled boom that now makes it harder for central banks to raise interest rates. Negative interest rates could damage the profitability of commercial banks and so impair their ability to lend and / or push them into riskier lending. Banks could also end up holding large amounts of their government's bonds and so create a potential doom loop. (A doom loop would occur where the credit rating of the debt of a nation was downgraded which would cause bond prices to fall, causing losses on debt portfolios held by banks and insurers, so reducing their capital and forcing them to sell bonds – which, in turn, would cause further falls in their prices etc.). In addition, the financial viability of pension funds could be damaged by low yields on holdings of bonds.

The overall longer run future trend is for gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, to rise, albeit gently. From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

In addition, PWLB rates are subject to ad hoc decisions by **H.M. Treasury** to change the margin over gilt yields charged in PWLB rates: such changes could be up or down. It is not clear that if gilt yields were to rise back up again by over 100bps within the next year or so, whether H M Treasury would remove the extra 100 bps margin implemented on 9.10.19.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many influences weighing on UK gilt yields and PWLB rates. The above forecasts, (and MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2020/21 with little increase in the following two years. However, if major progress was made with an agreed Brexit, then there is upside potential for earnings.
- Borrowing interest rates were on a major falling trend during the first half of 2019-20 but then jumped up by 100 bps on 9.10.19. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years. However, the unexpected increase of 100 bps in PWLB rates requires a major rethink of local authority treasury management strategy and risk management. Now that the gap between longer term borrowing rates and investment rates has materially widened, and in the long term Bank Rate is not expected to rise above 2.5%, it is unlikely that this authority will do any further longer term borrowing for the next three years, or until such time as the extra 100 bps margin is removed, other than to replace maturing debt or to finance Non Financial investments (e.g. loans to third parties) or commercial activities.

- There will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new short or medium-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

5.3 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

UK. Brexit. 2019 has been a year of upheaval on the political front as Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister to be replaced by Boris Johnson on a platform of the UK leaving the EU on 31 October 2019, with or without a deal. However, MPs blocked leaving on that date and the EU agreed an extension to 31 January 2020. In late October, MPs approved an outline of a Brexit deal to enable the UK to leave the EU on 31 January. Now that the Conservative Government has gained a large overall majority in the **general election** on 12 December, this outline deal will be passed by Parliament by that date. However, there will still be much uncertainty, as the detail of a trade deal will need to be negotiated by the current end of the transition period in December 2020, which the Prime Minister has pledged he will not extend. This could prove to be an unrealistically short timetable for such major negotiations that leaves open two possibilities; one, the need for an extension of negotiations, probably two years, or, a no deal Brexit in December 2020.

GDP growth has taken a hit from Brexit uncertainty during 2019; quarter three 2019 surprised on the upside by coming in at +0.4% q/q, +1.1% y/y. However, the peak of Brexit uncertainty during the final quarter appears to have suppressed quarterly growth to probably around zero. The economy is likely to tread water in 2020, with tepid growth around about 1% until there is more certainty after the trade deal deadline is passed.

While the Bank of England went through the routine of producing another **quarterly Inflation Report**, (now renamed the Monetary Policy Report), on 7 November, it is very questionable how much all the writing and numbers were worth when faced with the uncertainties of where the UK will be after the general election. The Bank made a change in their Brexit assumptions to now include a deal being eventually passed. Possibly the biggest message that was worth taking note of from the Monetary Policy Report, was an increase in concerns among MPC members around weak global economic growth and the potential for Brexit uncertainties to become entrenched and so delay UK economic recovery. Consequently, the MPC voted 7-2 to maintain Bank Rate at 0.75% but two members were sufficiently concerned to vote for an immediate Bank Rate cut to 0.5%. The MPC warned that if global growth does not pick up or Brexit uncertainties intensify, then a rate cut was now more likely. Conversely, if risks do recede, then a more rapid recovery of growth will require gradual and limited rate rises. The speed of recovery will depend on the extent to which uncertainty dissipates over the final terms for trade between the UK and EU and by how much global growth rates pick up. The Bank revised its inflation forecasts down – to 1.25% in 2019, 1.5% in 2020, and 2.0% in 2021; hence, the MPC views inflation as causing little concern in the near future.

The **MPC meeting of 19 December** repeated the previous month's vote of 7-2 to keep Bank Rate on hold. Their key view was that there was currently 'no evidence about the extent to which policy uncertainties among companies and households had declined' i.e. they were going to sit on their hands and see how the economy goes in the next few months. The two members who voted for a cut were concerned that the labour market was faltering. On the other hand, there was a clear warning in the minutes that the MPC were concerned that "domestic unit labour costs have continued to grow at rates above those consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term".

If economic growth were to weaken considerably, the MPC has relatively little room to make a big impact with Bank Rate still only at 0.75%. It would therefore, probably

suggest that it would be up to the Chancellor to provide help to support growth by way of a **fiscal boost** by e.g. tax cuts, increases in the annual expenditure budgets of government departments and services and expenditure on infrastructure projects, to boost the economy. The Government has already made moves in this direction and it made significant promises in its election manifesto to increase government spending by up to £20bn p.a., (this would add about 1% to GDP growth rates), by investing primarily in infrastructure. This is likely to be announced in the next Budget, probably in February 2020. The Chancellor has also amended the fiscal rules in November to allow for an increase in government expenditure.

As for **inflation** itself, CPI has been hovering around the Bank of England's target of 2% during 2019, but fell again in both October and November to a three-year low of 1.5%. It is likely to remain close to or under 2% over the next two years and so, it does not pose any immediate concern to the MPC at the current time. However, if there was a hard or no deal Brexit, inflation could rise towards 4%, primarily because of imported inflation on the back of a weakening pound.

With regard to the **labour market**, growth in numbers employed has been quite resilient through 2019 until the three months to September where it fell by 58,000. However, there was an encouraging pick up again in the three months to October to growth of 24,000, which showed that the labour market was not about to head into a major downturn. The unemployment rate held steady at a 44-year low of 3.8% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure in October. Wage inflation has been steadily falling from a high point of 3.9% in July to 3.5% in October (3-month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 2.0%. As the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. The other message from the fall in wage growth is that employers are beginning to find it easier to hire suitable staff, indicating that supply pressure in the labour market is easing.

USA. President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy in 2018 fuelled a temporary boost in consumption in that year which generated an upturn in the rate of growth to a robust 2.9% y/y. **Growth** in 2019 has been falling after a strong start in quarter 1 at 3.1%, (annualised rate), to 2.0% in quarter 2 and then 2.1% in quarter 3. The economy looks likely to have maintained a growth rate similar to quarter 3 into quarter 4; fears of a recession have largely dissipated. The strong growth in employment numbers during 2018 has weakened during 2019, indicating that the economy had been cooling, while inflationary pressures were also weakening. However, CPI inflation rose from 1.8% to 2.1% in November, a one year high, but this was singularly caused by a rise in gasoline prices.

The Fed finished its series of increases in rates to 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. In July 2019, it cut rates by 0.25% as a 'midterm adjustment' but flagged up that this was not intended to be seen as the start of a series of cuts to ward off a downturn in growth. It also ended its programme of quantitative tightening in August, (reducing its holdings of treasuries etc.). It then cut rates by 0.25% again in September and by another 0.25% in its October meeting to 1.50 – 1.75%. At its September meeting it also said it was going to **start buying Treasuries again**, although this was not to be seen as a resumption of quantitative easing but rather an exercise to relieve liquidity pressures in the repo market. Despite those protestations, this still means that the Fed is again expanding its balance sheet holdings of government debt. In the first month, it will buy \$60bn, whereas it had been reducing its balance sheet by \$50bn per month during 2019. As it will be buying only short-term (under 12 months) Treasury bills, it is technically correct that this is not quantitative easing (which is purchase of long term

debt). The Fed left rates unchanged in December. However, the accompanying statement was more optimistic about the future course of the economy so this would indicate that further cuts are unlikely.

Investor confidence has been badly rattled by the progressive ramping up of increases in tariffs President Trump has made on Chinese imports and China has responded with increases in tariffs on American imports. This **trade war** is seen as depressing US, Chinese and world growth. In the EU, it is also particularly impacting Germany as exports of goods and services are equivalent to 46% of total GDP. It will also impact developing countries dependent on exporting commodities to China. However, in November / December, progress has been made on agreeing a phase one deal between the US and China to roll back some of the tariffs; this gives some hope of resolving this dispute.

EUROZONE. Growth has been slowing from +1.8 % during 2018 to around half of that in 2019. Growth was +0.4% q/q (+1.2% y/y) in quarter 1, +0.2% q/q (+1.2% y/y) in quarter 2 and then +0.2% q/q, +1.1% in quarter 3; there appears to be little upside potential in the near future. German GDP growth has been struggling to stay in positive territory in 2019 and fell by -0.1% in quarter 2; industrial production was down 4% y/y in June with car production down 10% y/y. Germany would be particularly vulnerable to a no deal Brexit depressing exports further and if President Trump imposes tariffs on EU produced cars.

The European Central Bank (ECB) ended its programme of quantitative easing purchases of debt in December 2018, which then meant that the central banks in the US, UK and EU had all ended the phase of post financial crisis expansion of liquidity supporting world financial markets by quantitative easing purchases of debt. However, the downturn in EZ growth in the second half of 2018 and into 2019, together with inflation falling well under the upper limit of its target range of 0 to 2%, (but it aims to keep it near to 2%), has prompted the ECB to take new measures to stimulate growth. At its March meeting, it said that it expected to leave interest rates at their present levels “at least through the end of 2019”, but that was of little help to boosting growth in the near term. Consequently, it announced a **third round of TLTROs**; this provides banks with cheap borrowing every three months from September 2019 until March 2021 that means that, although they will have only a two-year maturity, the Bank was making funds available until 2023, two years later than under its previous policy. As with the last round, the new TLTROs will include an incentive to encourage bank lending, and they will be capped at 30% of a bank’s eligible loans. However, since then, the downturn in EZ and world growth has gathered momentum; at its meeting on 12 September it cut its deposit rate further into negative territory, from -0.4% to -0.5%, and announced a **resumption of quantitative easing purchases of debt for an unlimited period**. At its October meeting it said these purchases would start in November at €20bn per month - a relatively small amount compared to the previous buying programme. It also increased the maturity of the third round of TLTROs from two to three years. However, it is doubtful whether this loosening of monetary policy will have much impact on growth and, unsurprisingly, the ECB stated that governments would need to help stimulate growth by ‘growth friendly’ fiscal policy.

There were no policy changes in the December meeting, which was chaired for the first time by the new President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde. However, the outlook continued to be down beat about the economy; this makes it likely there will be further monetary policy stimulus to come in 2020. She did also announce a thorough review of how the ECB conducts monetary policy, including the price stability target. This review is likely to take all of 2020.

On the political front, Austria, Spain and Italy have been in the throes of **forming coalition governments** with some unlikely combinations of parties i.e. this raises questions around their likely endurance. The latest results of German state elections has put further pressure on the frail German CDU/SDP coalition government and on the current leadership of the CDU. The results of the Spanish general election in November have not helped the prospects of forming a stable coalition.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and shadow banking systems. In addition, there still needs to be a greater switch from investment in industrial capacity, property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production.

JAPAN - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

WORLD GROWTH. Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front, as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation. **Central banks are, therefore, likely to come under more pressure to support growth by looser monetary policy measures and this will militate against central banks increasing interest rates.**

The trade war between the US and China is a major concern to **financial markets** due to the synchronised general weakening of growth in the major economies of the world, compounded by fears that there could even be a recession looming up in the US, though this is probably overblown. These concerns resulted in **government bond yields** in the developed world falling significantly during 2019. If there were a major worldwide downturn in growth, central banks in most of the major economies will have limited ammunition available, in terms of monetary policy measures, when rates are already very low in most countries, (apart from the US). There are also concerns about how much distortion of financial markets has already occurred with the current levels of quantitative easing purchases of debt by central banks and the use of negative central bank rates in some countries. The latest PMI survey statistics of economic health for the US, UK, EU and China have all been predicting a downturn in growth;

this confirms investor sentiment that the outlook for growth during the year ahead is weak.

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 3.3 are **predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU**. On this basis, while GDP growth is likely to be subdued in 2019 and 2020 due to all the uncertainties around Brexit depressing consumer and business confidence, an agreement on the detailed terms of a trade deal is likely to lead to a boost to the rate of growth in subsequent years. This could, in turn, increase inflationary pressures in the economy and so cause the Bank of England to resume a series of gentle increases in Bank Rate. Just how fast, and how far, those increases will occur and rise to, will be data dependent. The forecasts in this report assume a modest recovery in the rate and timing of stronger growth and in the corresponding response by the Bank in raising rates.

- In the event of an **orderly non-agreement exit in December 2020**, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall.
- If there were a **disorderly Brexit**, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields correspondingly. Quantitative easing could also be restarted by the Bank of England. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably even, but dependent on a successful outcome of negotiations on a trade deal.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are broadly similarly to the downside.
- In the event that a Brexit deal was agreed with the EU and approved by Parliament, the balance of risks to economic growth and to increases in Bank Rate is likely to change to the upside.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. In 2018, Italy was a major concern due to having a populist coalition government which made a lot of anti-austerity and anti-EU noise. However, in September 2019 there was a major change in the coalition governing Italy which has brought to power a much more EU friendly government; this has eased the pressure on Italian

bonds. Only time will tell whether this new coalition based on an unlikely alliance of two very different parties will endure.

- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, particularly Italian banks.
- **German minority government.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in recent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly and this has raised a major question mark over continuing to support the CDU. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she intends to remain as Chancellor until 2021.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. There has also been rising anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- In October 2019, the IMF issued a report on the World Economic Outlook which flagged up a synchronised slowdown in world growth. However, it also flagged up that there was **potential for a rerun of the 2008 financial crisis**, but this time centred on the huge debt binge accumulated by corporations during the decade of low interest rates. This now means that there are corporates who would be unable to cover basic interest costs on **some \$19trn of corporate debt in major western economies**, if world growth was to dip further than just a minor cooling. This debt is mainly held by the shadow banking sector i.e. pension funds, insurers, hedge funds, asset managers etc., who, when there is \$15trn of corporate and government debt now yielding negative interest rates, have been searching for higher returns in riskier assets. Much of this debt is only marginally above investment grade so any rating downgrade could force some holders into a fire sale, which would then depress prices further and so set off a spiral down. The IMF's answer is to suggest imposing higher capital charges on lending to corporates and for central banks to regulate the investment operations of the shadow banking sector. In October 2019, the deputy Governor of the Bank of England also flagged up the dangers of banks and the shadow banking sector lending to corporates, especially highly leveraged corporates, which had risen back up to near pre-2008 levels.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **Brexit** – if agreement was reached all round that removed all threats of economic and political disruption between the EU and the UK.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation**, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

5.4 CRITERIA FOR SPECIFIED AND NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

Specified Investments are required to be in Sterling and have a maximum maturity of 1 year¹ and be of 'high credit quality'.

¹ *Allowing additional day(s) for deposits due to mature on a non-business day or that span a leap year.*

The definition of 'high credit quality' is set out below:

- Investments in Banks incorporated in the UK with a credit rating of at least A/F1, A1 or P1 with a limit of £2m on the amount invested.
- Investments in Banks incorporated outside of the UK but entitled to accept deposits in the UK, per the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority list of banks, with a credit rating of at least AA-/F1+/A1+/P1 with a limit of £2m on the amount invested.
- Investments in collective investment schemes, including money market funds, structured as Open Ended Investment Companies (OEIC's) with a long-term rating of AAA for Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV) funds and Low Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV) funds and AAA V1/S1 for Variable Net Asset Values (VNAV).
- Internal Investments up to 6 months, up to agreed limits, in UK Building Societies with an asset basis of over £1 billion.
- Corporate bonds rated AAA of less than one-year duration.
- The UK Government Debt Management Office's Debt Management Account Deposit Facility
- Local Authorities with a limit of £3m on the amount invested with each.

Non-Specified Investments are all investments over 1 year in duration and/or not meeting the definition of high credit quality listed above.

The Council amended its strategy in the 2018/19 Treasury Management Strategy Document to include Alternative Investment Instruments, such as Property Funds, in the Non-Specified Investment category. The use of these Alternative Investment Instruments can be deemed capital expenditure, and as such will be an application (spending) of capital resources. This Authority will seek guidance on the status of any such fund it may consider using. Appropriate due diligence will also be carried out before investment of this type is undertaken.

The Council limits non-specified treasury investments to £20m of the value of its investment portfolio at the point of investment, with the maximum amount invested being in line with criteria outlined in the Table above.

5.5 INTERNAL COUNTERPARTY LIST 2019/20 AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019

(Time limit 365 days ¹ unless specifically stated)

¹ Allowing additional day(s) for deposits due to mature on a non-business day or that span a leap year.

UK High Street Banks		
<i>UK or Irish bank with presence in UK and a short-term Fitch rating of F1 or higher</i>	Short-Term Fitch Rating	Max Investment
		£
Lloyds Banking Group		
Lloyds Bank plc (RFB)	F1	2,000,000
Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets (NRFB)	F1	2,000,000
Bank of Scotland plc (RFB)	F1	2,000,000
Others		
Santander UK plc	F1	2,000,000
Barclays Bank UK plc (RFB)	F1	2,000,000
Barclay Bank plc (NRFB)	F1	2,000,000
HSBC UK Bank plc (RFB)	F1+	2,000,000
HSBC Bank plc (NRFB)	F1+	2,000,000

Building Societies (time limit: up to 6 months)				
		Total Assets of Building Society	Assets > £1 Billion	Max Investment
		£000		£
1	Nationwide	236,035,000	Yes	3,000,000
2	Yorkshire	50,417,000	Yes	3,000,000
3	Coventry	45,446,000	Yes	3,000,000
4	Skipton	21,638,000	Yes	3,000,000
5	Leeds	19,643,000	Yes	3,000,000
6	Principality	9,502,000	Yes	3,000,000
7	West Bromwich	5,552,000	Yes	3,000,000
8	Nottingham	4,054,000	Yes	2,000,000
9	Newcastle	3,703,000	Yes	2,000,000
10	Cumberland	2,574,000	Yes	2,000,000
11	National Counties	2,162,000	Yes	2,000,000
12	Progressive	1,839,000	Yes	2,000,000
13	Cambridge	1,455,000	Yes	2,000,000
14	Newbury	1,116,000	Yes	2,000,000
15	Monmouthshire	1,110,000	Yes	2,000,000
16	Leek United	1,071,000	Yes	2,000,000
17	Saffron	1,036,000	Yes	2,000,000

Non UK Banks			
	Long-Term Fitch Rating	Short-Term Fitch Rating	Max Investment £
Abu Dhabi (U.A.E)			
First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Australia			
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Commonwealth Bank of Australia	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
National Australia Bank Ltd	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Westpac Banking Corporation	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Canada			
Bank of Montreal	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Bank of Nova Scotia	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Royal Bank of Canada	AA	F1+	2,000,000
Toronto Dominion Bank	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Finland			
Nordea Bank Abp	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Germany			
DZ Bank AG (Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank)	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Netherlands			
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A.	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Singapore			
DBS Bank Ltd	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
United Overseas Bank Ltd	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
Switzerland			
UBS AG	AA-	F1+	2,000,000
U.S.A			
Bank of New York Mellon, The	AA	F1+	2,000,000
Wells Fargo Bank NA	AA-	F1+	2,000,000

UK Government Debt Management Office	
	Max Investment £
The Debt Management Account Deposit Facility	Unlimited

UK Local, Police and Fire Authorities	
	Max Investment
	£
UK Local, Police and Fire Authorities	3,000,000

Money Market Funds		
	Rating	Max Investment
		£
Amundi Money Market Fund - Short Term (GBP)	AAA	3,000,000
CCLA - Public Sector Deposit Fund	AAA	3,000,000
Goldman Sachs Sterling Liquid Reserves Fund	AAA	3,000,000
Morgan Stanley Liquidity Funds - Sterling Liquidity Fund	AAA	3,000,000

5.6 CURRENT PORTFOLIO POSITION

The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2019 and for the position as at 31 December 2019 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

TREASURY PORTFOLIO				
	Actual	Actual	Current	Current
	31.3.19	31.3.19	31.12.19	31.12.19
	£000	%	£000	%
Treasury investments				
Banks				
Lloyds Bank Fixed Term Deposit	1,000	2.7%	1,000	1.9%
Bank of Scotland Fixed Term Deposit	1,000	2.7%	1,000	1.9%
Bank of Scotland Call Account	900	2.4%	900	1.7%
Building Societies - unrated				
National Counties Building Society	0	0.0%	2,000	3.8%
Nottingham Building Society	0	0.0%	2,000	3.8%
West Bromwich Building Society	0	0.0%	1,500	2.8%
Building Societies - rated	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Local Authorities				
Cornwall County Council	0	0.0%	3,000	5.6%
Wokingham Borough Council	0	0.0%	2,000	3.7%
Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council	0	0.0%	2,500	4.7%
Money Market Funds				
Amundi Money Market Fund - short term	1,200	3.2%	3,000	5.6%
CCLA - Public Sector Deposit Fund	3,000	8.1%	3,000	5.6%
Goldman Sachs - Sterling Liquid Reserves Fund	0	0.0%	1,450	2.7%
Total managed in house	7,100	19.2%	23,350	43.8%
Money Market Funds*				
Payden & Rygel Sterling Reserve Fund	15,435	41.7%	15,470	29.0%
Royal London Asset Management Cash Plus Fund	14,461	39.1%	14,480	27.2%
Property Funds	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total managed externally	29,896	80.8%	29,950	56.2%
Total treasury investments	36,996	100.0%	53,300	100.0%
Treasury external borrowing				
Local Authorities	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
PWLB	88,115	100.0%	87,173	100.0%
Total external borrowing	88,115	100.0%	87,173	100.0%
Net treasury investments / (borrowing)	(51,119)	0.0%	(33,873)	0.0%
<i>* market value</i>				

5.7 THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

The above is a list of specific responsibilities of the S151 officer in the 2017 Treasury Management Code. However, implicit in the recent changes in both codes, is a major extension of the functions of this role, especially in respect of non-financial (or non-treasury/ other) investments, (which CIPFA has defined as being part of treasury management). The following are examples of the major extension in the functions of this role: -

- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial (or non-treasury/ other) investments and treasury management.
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial (or non-treasury/ other) investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensuring that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial (or non-treasury/ other) assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial (or non-treasury/ other) investments and long term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following: -
 - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*

- *Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;*
- *Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;*
- *Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;*
- *Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.*